The banks challenged the Commission’s decision, arguing that specific trader discussions were not anti-competitive. Parties claimed these discussions merely concerned completed transactions and did not influence market conditions. The General Court dismissed these arguments, ruling that the information was sensitive and its exchange anti-competitive as it had the potential to affect EGB trading.
The conduct included exchange of commercially sensitive information, price-fixing arrangements, market sharing and customer allocation. The information was shared via chatrooms and bilateral communications by telephone or instant messaging and allowed the participants to be informed of each other’s conduct and strategies, thereby removing uncertainties in the market. As these exchanges were particularly harmful to competition, the Court ruled that the Commission did not err by not investigating or demonstrating the effects of this conduct on the market. Additionally, the Court confirmed that the conduct constituted one single and continuous infringement, rejecting all arguments from the parties submitting that the Commission erred in its conclusion.
The Court did, however, slightly moderate the fine for two of the cartelists as the Commission had not rightly identified the correct periods of the infringements.
On March 19, 2025, the General Court (Ninth Chamber) ruled (not available in English) in the case of Ivo Swenters v. European Commission. The case concerned an action for annulment of the Commission’s decision of January 13, 2023, which rejected Swenters’ complaint. The complaint alleged infringements of Article 101 TFEU by SCR-Sibelco N.V. and other companies, as well as an alleged infringement of Article 102 TFEU by Sibelco in the market for the extraction and supply of quartz sand in Belgium. Swenters had requested the Commission to investigate these alleged violations of competition law. He claimed that his shares in LBU, which he sold in 1995, had been undervalued due to these infringements and this caused him financial harm.
The Commission rejected Swenters’ complaint based on Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, stating that the Union’s interest was not significant enough to justify an investigation. This decision was based on the assessment that the alleged anti-competitive practices appeared to be confined to a single Member State (Belgium), that the extraction and exploitation of quartz sand were subject to national regulations, and that Belgian competition authorities and courts were best placed to assess the relevant facts and safeguard Swenters’ rights. Additionally, the Commission noted that a national court had already examined the alleged facts in two separate proceedings.
The General Court dismissed Swenters’ appeal, ruling that the Commission had fulfilled its duty to state reasons by clearly explaining why Belgian authorities and courts were competent to handle the complaint and why the Union’s interest was insufficient. The Court further emphasized that the Commission was not obliged to initiate an investigation or establish the existence of the alleged infringement but only to carefully assess the information brought to its attention.
Merger control
European Commission unconditionally approves Nokia’s acquisition of Infinera
The European Commission (“Commission”) has unconditionally approved the proposed acquisition of Infinera Corporation by Nokia Corporation. Nokia, based in Finland, is a publicly traded company operating globally across various sectors, including network infrastructure, mobile networks, cloud and networking services, as well as technology development. Infinera, headquartered in the United States, is also a publicly traded company and a global provider of networking solutions, including network equipment, optical semiconductors, software, and services.
Both undertakings supply optical transport equipment used to transmit data through optical fibre cables. Following its assessment, the Commission concluded that the transaction does not raise competition concerns. The combined market shares are moderate and there are credible competitors that will continue to exert sufficient competitive pressure upon Nokia.
BCA closes investigation in “flour case” following abandonment of the acquisition
On March 20, 2025, the Belgian Competition Authority (“BCA”) announced that it will close its investigation in the so-called "flour case." This investigation concerned the proposed acquisition of the artisanal bakery activities of Ceres by its competitor, Dossche Mills.
Although the transaction was not subject to a mandatory notification under merger control rules, the BCA initiated an investigation due to serious indications of a potential restriction of competition between the two largest flour producers for artisanal bakeries in Belgium. The investigation was conducted under Article 101 TFEU and Article IV.1 of the Belgian Code of Economic Law. According to the BCA, this approach was in line with the Court of Justice of the European Union’s Towercast-ruling.
As part of its expedited review, the BCA contacted various industry stakeholders and collected data to assess market positions and the potential impact of the transaction. After the BCA had informed Dossche Mills and Ceres of its preliminary conclusions and after it had conducted further inquiries, both companies confirmed that they have terminated the agreements for the proposed transaction. As a result, the BCA decided to close the investigation in the flour case.
Dutch competition authority clears acquisitions by Foresco after first investigation based on ‘serial acquisitions’ concept
The Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (“ACM”) has granted a permit for the acquisition of D.G. De With Ermelo B.V. (“DWP”) and Vierhouten Palletindustrie B.V. (“Vierhouten”) by Forseco Packaging N.V. (“Foresco”). This acquisition took place in the context of an acquisition strategy pursued by Foresco since 2019, which, according to the ACM, can be described as ‘serial acquisitions’ or ‘stringing beads’. In this strategy, a company acquires a series of smaller competing companies which ultimately may lead to a substantial lessening of competition. Foresco did not have to report the vast majority of previous acquisitions to the ACM, because the target companies did not meet the turnover threshold. This is the first time that the ACM has scrutinised the ‘stringing beads’ strategy when assessing a proposed acquisition.
The ACM indicates that it is in principle neutral about a strategy of stringing beads. The ACM acknowledges that ‘serial acquisitions’ can lead to positive effects in some cases, such as the creation of economies of scale. On the other hand, the ACM also states that this strategy can lead to significant impediments to competition, comparable to one large takeover, for example by creating or strengthening a position of economic power. In assessing the proposed takeover of DWP-Vierhouten, the ACM therefore specifically looked at various scenarios in which such a strategy could lead to competition concerns, including the creation or strengthening of a position of economic power and the creation of such a position of power in the future. In addition, the ACM indicated that the following circumstances may also play a role in its assessment: i) the takeover candidate itself planned to grow significantly, ii) the takeover candidate is a crucial target for competitors with growth plans, iii) the takeover candidate has a disproportionately large impact on commercial negotiations or iv) the takeover candidate plays a special role in the competitive game on the relevant market (it is a so-called ‘maverick’).
Based on the investigation, the ACM concludes that the acquisition of DWP and Vierhouten by Foresco will not significantly impede competition on the market for the sale of wooden pallets in the Netherlands. Although Foresco has become the market leader through previous acquisitions, its current market share, even after the acquisition of DWP and Vierhouten, remains below 40 percent. The ACM establishes that there is sufficient competitive pressure from other pallet sellers and buyer power to prevent Foresco from being able to act independently of them. In addition, there are insufficient concrete indications that going forward Foresco will continue this acquisition strategy in the Netherlands. The ACM has therefore decided to grant a permit for the acquisition.
Dutch competition authority starts investigation of an acquisition below the notification thresholds
On 7 March 2025, the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (“ACM”) announced that it would launch an investigation into the acquisition of the Dutch branch of the German company Ziemann by competitor Brink’s. Both companies specialise in cash-in-transit services. Given that the turnover thresholds for a merger filing are not met, the ACM cannot apply the regular rules for merger control.
The ACM has concerns about the competition in this market, in which only a limited number of market participants are active. Therefore, the ACM will start an investigation even though the relevant merger control notification thresholds are not met. The ACM will now investigate whether or not antitrust rules have been violated, including the prohibition on abuse of dominance.
The ACM seems to be acting based on the Towercast precedent, although the ACM does not explicitly refer to this judgment of the EU Court of Justice. This ruling has clarified that a concentration that is not subject to notification under European or national merger control law can still be investigated under Article 102 TFEU if there are indications of a restriction of competition. The investigation will probably focus on the question of whether the takeover could lead to a (collective) dominant position and whether this position could be abused on the Dutch market, thereby restricting competition and possibly affecting trade between EU Member States.
State aid
Commission deems Spanish arbitration award in renewable energy case illegal state aid
The European Commission (“Commission”) has concluded that an arbitration award directing Spain to compensate an undertaking for damages resulting from modifications to a renewable electricity support measure constitutes illegal state aid. The Commission has instructed Spain not to make any payments to any party based on this arbitration award and to ensure that the award is not recognized, enforced, or implemented in any manner. The Commission reminds national courts of their duty to ensure that Spain complies with this decision, including taking measures to prevent recognition, enforcement, or implementation of the arbitration award in third countries.
The case relates to a renewable energy support scheme introduced by Spain in 2007 without prior approval from the Commission. In 2013, Spain amended the conditions of this scheme, affecting installations already receiving support. Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg and Antin Energie Termosolar B.V, undertakings that had invested in Spanish renewable energy projects under the 2007 scheme, initiated arbitration proceedings, claiming compensation for damages to its investments caused by the changes in the Spanish legal framework. . In 2018, the arbitration tribunal found Spain in breach of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and ordered Spain to pay Antin €101 million plus interest. Spain notified this award to the Commission.
Following an investigation, the Commission determined that the arbitration award, and any potential execution or payment thereof, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The Commission concluded that execution of this award is incompatible with the functioning of the internal market. Furthermore, the Commission emphasized that a measure violating other provisions of EU law cannot be declared compatible.
In this regard, the Commission considers that the award could be in breach of Article 19(1) TEU, Articles 267 and 344 TFEU, and the general principles of Union law of mutual trust and autonomy. The Commission referenced the judgment of the Court of Justice in the Komstroy-case, in which the Court ruled that ECT arbitration provisions do not apply to intra-EU disputes, thereby rendering the arbitration proceedings in this case without legal basis. Applying an arbitration clause to an intra-EU dispute undermines the system of remedies provided for in EU law and poses a threat to the autonomy of EU law and the principle of mutual trust among Member States. While the arbitration award itself constitutes a grant of aid, there has been no effective payment yet thereby obviating the need for recovery. Spain must continue to resist attempts to enforce the award and must not voluntarily pay the compensation.